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Abstract
In this paper we study the effects of the change in contract length on the agents’ incentives
to invest and exert effort. We present an agent’s dynamic decision model that explicitly deals
with two types of investments and directly allows for contract regime switching by varying
the probability of contract renewal parameter. The fact that the unobservable investment in
human capital is complementary with the agent’s effort produces a result that increasing the
probability of contract renewal increases investment and effort, with the consequent increase
in production. We also show that there exists a specific level of investment in human capital,
for which the investment in physical capital is profitable. We test these theoretical predictions
∗This research has been initiated in Fall 2007 semester while T. Vukina was a Fulbright scholar at the
Graduate School of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, Croatia. We particularly thank Bernard
Salanie´ for his comments as well as seminar participants at Toulouse School of Economics. All errors are
ours.
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using contract settlement data for the production of hatching eggs. The data was generated by a
natural experiment where during the period covered by the data the contract had changed from
short-term to long-term. The obtained empirical results are largely supportive of the developed
theory.
1 Introduction
The production contracts between integrator firms (principals) and independent farmers
(agents) in many agricultural settings (e.g., chickens, hogs, grapes, tobacco) are typically
short term, i.e. at the end of one production cycle the contract is tacitly renewed unless ex-
plicitly canceled. The reason for short-term contracting in repeated transactions is the desire
of parties to retain flexibility in uncertain business environments. The lack of commitment
to continue the relationship beyond the current period is also a source of implicit incentives
that can be utilized to mitigate asymmetric information problems.1 Occasionally, one can
observe situations where changes in contracting environments cause parties to change the
duration of their contractual relationship. One such example that has recently come to our
attention is the conversion of a short-term contract for the production of hatching eggs into a
long-term one. The production of hatching eggs constitutes an early stage in the production
of broiler chickens, which is usually organized as a profit center within a completely vertically
integrated company involved in the production and distribution of poultry products.
In this paper we argue that such a contract conversion presents a natural experiment that
can be utilized to empirically measure the incentive effects of the contract switch on agents’
behavior. We hypothesize that replacing a short-term contract with a long-term one affects
agents’ incentives to carry out observable and unobservable investments with a measurable
impact on agents’ performance across various productivity margins.
The basic insight of natural experiments is that incentives effects are easier to assess when
they stem from some exogenous change in incentives structure. In this case there no selection
bias due to endogenous contract duration choice because the same people successively face
different contracts and hence any resulting change in behavior can safely be attributed to
1According to Salanie´ (1997), commitment refers to the ability of agents to restrict their future actions
by pledging that they will stick to the contract until some predetermined date, and breach of contract
and renegotiation are the opposite of commitment. For the dynamics of contracts under full commitment
see Laffont and Martimort (2002) and for the dynamics of complete contracts under various degrees of
commitment see also Salanie´ (1997).
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the variation in incentives. A potential limitation of this kind of analysis is that the change
in the incentive structure may fail to be truly exogenous. This is especially the case for
firms which are supposed to adopt optimal contracts. If the switch from short-term to long-
term contracts indicates that for some reason short-term contracts were optimal before the
change but ceased to be optimal by the time the change has been implemented, then a direct
regression will provide biased estimates, at least to the extent that the factors affecting the
efficiency of short-term contracts had an impact on growers’ investments and productivity
(Chiappori and Salanie´ (2003)).
The main objective of this paper, however, is not to explain what caused the contract
to switch from short-term to long-term, as various smaller changes in the contract’s pay-
ment mechanism have been rather frequent throughout the period covered by the data, and
therefore difficult to explain. Consequently, we make no claims about the optimality of con-
tracts either before or after the switch. Acknowledging the reality that in actual business
environments inefficient contracts could exist, we argue that the observed contract changed
in a response to exogenous change in the regulatory environment and analyze its effect on
growers incentives.
Long-term contracts have certain advantages and disadvantages over short-term contracts.
First, long-term contracts provide better incentives for non-observable investments. This
result can be deduced from the property rights theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart 1986;
Hart and Moore, 1990; and Hart, 1995). This theory takes the incompleteness of contracts
and the existence of ex-post quasi rents to continuing an existing relationship (due to turn-
over costs and asset specificity) as critical to understanding the problem of under-investment.
The theory then focuses on how ownership of physical assets, which confers residual rights
of control over these assets alters the efficiency of trading relationships (Whinston, 2003).2
Second, long-term contracts can be used to smooth consumption and reduce risk when the
2Because the long-term contracts are generally also incomplete, switching from short-term to long-term
contracting will not automatically solve the under-investment problem. Under-investment can be overcome by
designing the rules that govern the process of contractual renegotiation, for details see Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey (1994).
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agents has no access to credit markets. This result follows from the repeated moral hazard
models where long-term contracts which allowed for delayed retaliation tend to be more
efficient (Chiappori et al., 1994).3 Finally, long-term contracts involve lower transaction
costs because they need to be agreed upon less frequently (e.g., Bandiera, 2007).
One of the main disadvantage of the long-term contracts stems from the fact that the
principal’s commitment to continuing the relationship removes the threat of contract ter-
mination which otherwise could serve the purpose of providing the agent with incentives to
exert effort. In addition to eliciting effort, the threat of contract termination could provide
incentives to invest as investments increase output in the next period and hence the probabil-
ity of contract renewal (Banerjee and Ghatak, 2004). Secondly, the principal’s commitment
to long-term contracts could hinder his supply response to unfavorable market conditions
and negatively affect the profitability and perhaps even lead to bankruptcy.4 On the other
hand, with short term contracts, when demand is sluggish or input prices are high, the least
productive agents’ contracts could be easily terminated.
The empirical literature on contract duration is rather thin, with some notable exceptions.
Joskow (1987) showed that contracts between coal suppliers and electric utilities are longer
when relationship-specific investments are important. Crocker and Masten (1988) showed
that natural gas contracts are shorter when flexibility becomes more important. Brickley,
Misra and Van Horn (2006) found that the duration of franchise agreements increases as
the non-contractible investments become more important and decreases when the need for
flexibility increases. Bandiera (2007) found that the choice of tenancy contract length is
driven by the need to provide incentives for non-observable investments taking into account
transactions costs and imperfections in the credit market that makes incentives provision
costly. Finally, based on the contracts between carriers and truck drivers, Masten (2009)
3In cases when the agent has access to credit markets, the outcome of the long-term contract can be
replicated by a sequence of short-term contracts and the rationale for long-term contracting disappears, see
Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990).
4The importance of bankruptcy constraint for the choice of optimal payment scheme in the context of
agricultural contracts have been studied by Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999).
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showed that the use of long-term contracts can be justified, even when trade involves no
relationship-specific investments and termination is the only remedy, as a device for mini-
mizing the cost of determining prices in a series of heterogenous transactions.
Our paper is unique in two respects. First, it provides a complex but analytically tractable
dynamic decision model that explicitly deals with two types of investments and directly al-
lows for contract regime switching by varying the probability of contract renewal parameter.
The fact that the unobservable investment in human capital (specific knowledge) is comple-
mentary with the agent’s effort produces a result that increasing the probability of contract
renewal increases investment and effort, with the consequent increase in production. Re-
garding the second type of investment, the theory shows that there exists a specific level
of investment in human capital, for which the investment in physical capital (technology
adoption) is profitable.
The theoretical predictions are then tested using an unbalanced panel of contract settle-
ment data for the production of hatching eggs. This unique data set comes from one poultry
company that contracts the production with 68 growers (farmers) divided in 2 divisions
(profit centers). We show that switching from a short-term to a long-term contract resulted
in faster adoption of both observable and unobservable productivity enhancing technologies
and practices and increased effort that initially improved performance across various perfor-
mance margins. After technological change has been fully absorbed, the performance across
all margins decreased which could be attributable to the reduction in the steady-state level
of effort.
2 The Comparison of Contracts
The broiler industry is often considered a role model for the industrialization of agriculture.
The industry is entirely vertically integrated from breeding flocks and hatcheries, to pro-
duction (grow-out) of broiler chickens, to feed mills, transportation divisions and processing
plants. The production of broiler involves three stages: raising broiler breeder males (cock-
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erels) and hens (pullets), housing the mature breeding flock for the production of hatching
eggs, and growing of commercial broilers. Various stages of broiler production are typically
covered by different contracts and farmers generally specialize in one production stage under
one contract. Our analysis is based on the individual contract settlements for the production
of hatching eggs in two production divisions owned by the same company in the period from
1992 to 2003. Approximately in the middle of that period, the company decided to change
the contract duration. The new contract became effective for all flocks delivered on or after
January 1, 1997. Compared to the old contract which was a flock-by-flock contract, the new
contract guarantees the continuous delivery of flocks for the period of 15 years.
The data set consists of contract settlement sheets for 498 flocks tended by 68 contract
growers. The list includes all growers under contract with two different profit centers of
the same company. The largest number of flocks per grower is 11 (6 growers) and the
smallest number of flocks is 1 (3 growers). Since the data for 2003 is incomplete, there is
also substantial number of growers that had 10 or 9 flocks (27 growers). Growers with 8,
9, 10 or 11 flocks amount to 55% of the data. Growers with only a few flocks are those
that signed the contract with the company or left the company during the period covered
by the data. As seen from those numbers, there is very limited entry and exit of growers
into the pool. This is perfectly normal in other contracts of this type. When the company
opens a new profit center (processing plant and hatchery) they try to hire all growers they
need to keep this division running at full capacity all at once. Once enough growers are
signed up, hiring stops and will typically occur only as replacement for growers that are
leaving (retiring, switching integrators or whose contracts were terminated). Since none of
this happens very frequently, the turn-over is relatively small. More noticeable changes in
the steady-state number of growers happens rarely, only in cases of capacity expansion or
severe and prolonged reduction in global demand for poultry meat.5
5Regular fluctuations in demand are met by increasing or decreasing the number of flocks per existing
grower (by extending or shrinking the down-time periods among flocks). Only in extreme cases the supply
response would involve terminating the contracts with existing growers, as hiring them back on a short notice
would be nearly impossible.
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The true reasons for the contract duration change are unknown. In official written com-
munications between the company management and the growers the company stated that
it is changing the contract in response to growers’ concerns about the uncertainties related
to contract renewal and the desire to build better integrator-grower relations. In addition
to increasing pressure from the contract growers associations, we also believe that the com-
pany acted proactively to anticipated government regulation regarding the type of contracts
that poultry integrators and contract growers can sign. At that time, among other things, a
number of regulatory proposals were focused precisely on contract termination clauses and
dispute resolution procedures.6
Aside from the frequent changes in the payment mechanism (precisely documented below),
which appears to be totally unrelated to the contract duration change, the immediate material
consequences of the contract switch appears to be minimal from the growers’ perspective.
According to the new contract, the decisions about the number of flocks the grower will
receive, the number of pullets and cockerels included in each flock, the time of removing each
flock, and the date, time and interval of placement for any future flocks remained under the
sole discretion of the company. In fact, based on the available 12-year records (1992-2003),
6The main federal legislation concerning contracts in agriculture is the Packers and Stockyard Act of
1921 (P&S Act) enforced by the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) of the
US Department of Agriculture. The 1987 amendments brought the poultry contracts under the P&S Act.
From that time on, the list of numerous state and federal governments’ attempts to regulate the poultry
industry contracts grew larger and larger. The period around the time this company decided to change the
contract duration is concentrated with regulatory proposals. For example, 1997 in an advanced notice of
proposed rule making, GIPSA announced that it is considering the need for issuing substantive regulation
of poultry contracts; for an overview see Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006b). Interestingly enough, over
the years most of the substantive regulatory proposals were successfully derailed by the industry lobbying.
Most recently, however, GIPSA promulgated a final rule (published on December 3, 2009 at 74 Fed. Reg.
63271) that takes aim at the lack of transparency in the poultry market. Of course the rule does not go as
far as requiring that all contract be long-term, it only requires the live poultry dealers to provide a 90-day
written termination notice if the poultry growing agreement is terminated, not renewed, or expires with no
subsequent replacement of the agreement. The notice must state the reason(s) for termination, the effective
date of termination, and any appeal rights that the grower may have with the live poultry dealer.
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the behavior of the integrator regarding the frequency of the delivery of flocks to growers is
the same before and after the switch. Each grower received approximately one flock per year
and those growers for which the time-out period was unusually long were awarded an extra
payment to compensate them for the loss of income.
The division of responsibilities for providing inputs in the production of hatching eggs
between the old and the new contract also remained unchanged. In both contracts the
principal’s responsibility is to supply breeder chickens, feed, litter, medication and technical
instruction. Agents’ responsibilities are to provide proper care and maintenance of flocks,
housing, equipment, and other facilities necessary to gather, grade and maintain hatching
eggs.
The payment mechanisms in both contracts are some variants of the variable piece rates,
sometimes also known as a fixed performance benchmark schemes. The payment mechanism
in the old contract consists of the finishing fee, piece rates for the hatching eggs and commer-
cial eggs, the hatchability bonus and the feed conversion bonus. Over the years (see Table 1)
the payment mechanism has been amended multiple times, such that the last version of the
old contract prior to the introduction of the new contract has the same payment mechanism
as the one used in the new long-term contract. In fact the new contract merely incorporated
the changes to the payment mechanism that were made to the old contract over the years
prior to ushering of the new contract.
Table 1: here
The payment mechanism in the new contract has an identical finishing fee (2.5 cents per
chicken per week until the birds are 25 weeks of age) and an identical piece rate for commercial
eggs (9 cents per dozen) as in the old contract. These two elements of the payment scheme
have not changed during the analyzed 12-year interval. However, the piece rate for hatching
eggs has been changed multiple times from as low as 27 cents per dozen hatching eggs at
the end of 1991 to 32 cents base rate in January of 2000 when the last correction to the
payment scheme took place. In addition, the contract has two types of equipment bonuses:
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2 cents per dozen of hatching eggs (introduced in January 1993) if a grower installs male
feeders and high profile grills7, and 2 cents per dozen of hatching eggs (introduced in April
1995, subsequently raised to 3 cents in March 1998) if a grower installs cool cells.8 Starting
in July 1996, the contract begins to officially distinguish the ”in-season” and the ”out-of-
season” flocks in the sense that the out-of-season flocks receive an additional 1 cent per dozen
hatching eggs premium. The out-of-season flocks are flocks that were placed on a pullet farm
during the months of November, December, January or February. Adding the equipment
and out-of-season premiums, the composite piece rate for hatching eggs in 2000 for growers
with installed male feeders and cool cells was 37 cents per dozen hatching eggs (32+2+3) for
in-season flocks and 38 cents (32+1+2+3) for the out-of-season flocks.
Both contracts have the hatchability and feed conversion bonuses but their specifications
also changed multiple times over the years. In the early versions of the old contract the
hatchability bonus was symmetric around 85% hatchability, with the bonus/penalty in the
amount of 0.5 cents per dozen hatching eggs for each percent deviation from 85%. This
formula remained intact for the in-season flocks until January 2000 when the benchmark was
lowered to 84% and the rate was increased to 1 cent per dozen hatching eggs. However,
beginning with pullets started on November 1, 1992, the formula for the out-of-season flocks
changed such that each percent hatchability above 85% carried a bonus of 0.5 cents per dozen
hatching eggs, whereas the penalty in the same amount was imposed only for each percent
hatchability below 83%. In January 2000, the 83-85% range benchmark hatchability was
lowered to 82-84% and the rate was raised from 0.5 cent to 1 cent per dozen hatching eggs.
7Male feeders work well in combination with hen only feeders. The two grills combined ensure that the
birds receive the optimal nutrition. If the birds are allowed to eat each others feed, the males will get fat
(and may develop visceral gout) and their fertility will go down and the hens will not get enough protein or
calcium.
8Cool cells enhance the house environment through increased air flow in the building. This is most
important in summer during hot weather. The cooler environment will help the hens maintain feed intake
and subsequent egg production. Installing cool cells is rather expensive, for an average 10,000 hens house
the cost would be between $5,000 and $6,000 (personal communication with Drs. Ken Anderson and Edgar
Oviedo, Poultry Science, North Carolina State University).
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Prior to July 1996, the feed conversion bonus was symmetric around 7.5 pounds of feed per
dozen hatching eggs, with the bonus/penalty in the amount of 4 cents per dozen hatching
eggs for each pound deviation from 7.5 pounds. Since then, the feed conversion bonus
remained symmetric around 7.5 pounds for the in-season flocks and around 7.75 pounds for
the out-of-season flocks. In 2000, the benchmark feed conversion ratios were raised to 7.75
for in-season flocks and 8.00 for out-of-season flocks. For the purposes of calculating bonuses,
the individual grower feed conversion ratios and hatchability are always calculated for flocks
to 65 weeks of age. If the integrator decides to keep the flocks beyond the 65 weeks of age, the
feed conversion and hatchability beyond 65 weeks of age are ignored. In both old and new
contracts the aggregate bonus, i.e., the sum of the hatchability and feed conversion bonuses,
cannot be negative. If the sum turns out to be negative, there is always a truncation at zero.
Finally, both old and new contracts have identical minimum guarantee payments and
catastrophic payments. The minimum guarantee payment is defined in reference to the total
base egg payment (hatching plus commercial) and guarantees the grower that the total base
egg payment will not be smaller than 0.75 cents per square foot of the floor space of the
chicken house per week for 40 weeks (between age 25 and 65 weeks). In case of certain
catastrophic diseases that render eggs produced unsuitable for hatching purposes or in case
of some natural calamity, the minimum guarantee payment will not apply. Instead, the
grower will be compensated 0.75 cents per square foot of the floor space for the period of
time after the chickens are 25 weeks of age until the occurrence of the catastrophic event.
In summary, the comparison of the contract forms between the old short-term contract
and the new long-term contract leads to the following conclusions: (a) all strategic decisions
about the timing of placements and removals of flocks and also their size and density, as
well as the division of responsibilities for providing inputs between the integrator and the
growers are all identical in both contracts; (b) frequent changes in the payment mechanism
and its parameters are less likely to be caused by the changes in technology (nutrition and
genetics) as technological changes do not happen with such frequency, but are more likely due
to the adjustments needed to keep the grower remuneration in line with the macroeconomic
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environment (cost and wage inflation, interest rates, etc.) or are simply the result of a
trial and error process in search for the contract that works best; (c) the last version of the
payment scheme in the old short-term contract and the first version of the payment scheme in
the new long-term contract are identical; in fact, the long-term contract merely incorporated
the changes to the payment mechanism that were made to the short-term contract over
the years prior to ushering of the new long-term contract. The only material change is the
commitment on the part of the integrator to deliver the new flocks of birds to the growers’
farms for the period of 15 years.9
2.1 Chronological Comparison of Performance Measures
Before proceeding with the formal analysis of agents’ behavior under different contracting
environments, we want to see whether we can detect any obvious discrete breaks in various
physical performance measures that could have been caused by the contract switch. We use
three groups of performance measures: the number of eggs produced (hatching eggs and total
eggs), the hatchability of eggs, and the feed conversion ratios. In the first group we look at 4
indicators: the number (in dozens) of hatching eggs per hen (ratio), the number of hatching
eggs per square foot (ratio1), the total number of eggs (hatching plus commercial) per hen
(ratio2), and the total number of eggs per square foot (ratio3). The results are presented
in Table 2. All four performance measures exhibit similar patterns. Two results are worth
mentioning. First, the switch from a short-term to the long-term contract in 1997 caused a
noticeable improvement in all four performance measures. The production of eggs either per
hen or per square foot of the chicken house increased by more than a half a dozen eggs. The
increase came mainly from the increased production of hatching eggs.
Table 2: here
Second, a sharp drop in all performance measures starting in 1998, and continuing in 1999,
could be explained by the change in breed. Starting in 1998, the company started changing
9The stipulations for the unilateral termination of contracts in cases of grower’s gross negligence, theft of
birds, eggs or feed, etc., still remained the same as in the old flock-by-flock contract.
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the dominant breed of chickens from a Peterson male and Arbor Acre female to a Ross male
and a Ross female. The change has been made to improve the feed conversion and processing
yield of broilers whose production is part of a vertically integrated chain owned by the same
company. However, the problem associated with this switch is that the egg production and
hatchability of the new breed could become lower, especially if the hen house environment
is not properly controlled, as the Ross males and females are more susceptible to heat stress
than the old breeds. To counteract this change, the company increased the base price for
hatching eggs as well as the cool cell equipment bonus (see Table 1 for details). However,
it looks like that these additional incentives were not sufficient to offset the negative effects
caused by the breed change and neither was the massive adoption of cool cells that followed
the contract duration change from short-term to long-term. As will be explained later, in
addition to the change of breed, the deterioration of performance measures could also be the
result of a decrease in effort that could have occurred after growers fully adopted the new
performance enhancing technologies.
The second group of performance indicators deals with the hatchability of eggs. To be
considered a hatching egg, an egg must weigh at least 1.75 oz. (21 ounces per dozen), have a
normal shell, have no dirt adhering to the shell, and have no stain larger than the size of a
nickel. All eggs that do not meet the above criteria, as well as double yolk eggs, are classified
as commercial eggs. However, not all eggs classified as hatching eggs will eventually hatch.
Some hatching eggs may not be fertile or could have some other deformities not visible from
the outside. Only hatching eggs that actually hatch are considered a success. Therefore,
in the second group we use three performance indicators: the number of hatching eggs that
actually hatched (hateg), the number of hatching eggs that hatched per hen (ht), and the
number of hatching eggs that hatched per square foot of the chicken house (htsqft). The
results exhibit the same patterns as the egg production indicators: the performance improved
in 1997 due to the contract change, and then the performance deteriorated in 1998/1999 as
the results of the breed change.
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Finally, we look at feed conversion ratios. In this group we use two performance indicators:
total feed conversion (fct) and feed conversion for hatching eggs (fch). Feed conversion is
defined as pounds of feed used to produce one dozen eggs. Clearly the smaller the number,
the better the performance. Same as before, the results indicate that both feed conversion
measures improved in 1997 in comparison to the earlier years as a result of contract switch
and both of them deteriorated in 1998 and beyond as a result of the breed change.
2.2 Chronological Comparison of Contract Payments
Next, we want to see whether we can detect any immediate changes in growers monetary
compensations associated with operating in the new contractual environment. We compare
grower payoffs chronologically using average annual contract payment per flock, average
annual payment per hen, and average annual payment per square foot of the chicken house.10
The results are presented in Table 3.
The combined data for both divisions show that the average total payment per flock
more or less continuously increased in the 1993-2002 period at an average annual rate of 5%
nominally or about 2.5% in constant 2002 dollars.11 Part of that increase may be due to the
increase in capacity (more square footage) or higher population density (more birds per square
foot) and as such may not accurately represent growers’ returns and overall satisfaction with
the introduced changes in the payment scheme. Therefore we look at two other indicators
where the impact of the capacity/density increase is eliminated. First, we see that the
average payment per hen increased from $4.36 in 1993 to $5.73 in 2002 which amounts to
a 3.1% increase nominally or about 0.6% in constant 2002 dollars. Secondly, the payment
per square foot of the chicken house increased from $2.07 in 1993 to $2.92 in 2002, which
10The year in which a particular flock belongs is determined by the date when the flock was sold. This is
convenient because it allows us to put the realized payments for 1997 squarely into the old regime because
flocks sold in 1997 could not have been started under the new contract that became operational for birds
delivered on or after January 1, 2007.
11Constant 2002 dollars values are obtained by dividing the nominal values by the CPI index. Since the
data for 2003 is not complete, it was excluded from the calculation of annual averages.
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represents an average annual increase of 3.9% nominally or about 1.4% in 2002 dollars. These
two indicators measure different things to the extent that the density of birds placed differ
across flocks and growers. The casual inspection of the results reveals that the ratio between
payment per hen and payment per square foot is not constant but rather varied across years
as the company’s policy regarding the density of hens changed. Finally, the volatility of the
payment per hen and the payment per square foot also increased substantially in the 1993-
2002 period as a result of the company’s gradual introduction of higher-powered incentives
scheme.
Table 3: here
If we divide the entire period into 2 sub-periods representing the old (flock-by-flock)
and the new (long-term) contracts and compare the average grower payoffs for these two
subperiods, the results show the improvements in the long-term contract period for all three
payoffs. In the period 1993-1997, the average annual per flock payment amounted to $92,321,
the average per hen payment was $5.63 and the average payment per square foot of the chicken
house was $2.70, whereas in the 1998-2002 period the payoffs were $105,137, $5.74 and $2.88
respectively, all expressed in constant 2002 dollars.12 The largest difference between the two
contracts is recorded in the payment per flock (13.9%), followed by the payment per square
foot (6.7%), whereas the smallest difference is in the payment per hen (2%).
Based on the reported results, it follows that the average annual grower payoffs are con-
sistently higher under the long-run contract than they were under the old flock-by-flock
contract. This seems to be indicating that the immediate financial implication of the con-
tract change from the growers’ perspective is positive, at least as far as the revenue side is
concerned. However, the nature of the data set does not allow us to reconstruct the growers’
cost side, therefore the impact of the contract change on the profitability of the enterprise is
impossible to determine.
12The results are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the incomplete data for 2003.
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3 Theoretical Model and Testable Predictions
The theoretical framework that we develop in this section is based on a principal-agent model
where the principal (poultry company) contracts the production of hatching eggs with an
independent agent (farmer). The central feature of our model is its emphasis on the incentives
to invest that could be altered when the contract regime switches from short-term to long-
term. We define two types of investments. The agent can invest in physical capital ϕ which is
deemed observable, and human capital or specific knowledge k which is deemed unobservable.
The investment in physical capital (production technology) ϕ is discrete, i.e. the agent either
installs the cool cells (or male feeders) in which case ϕ = 1 or does not in which case ϕ = 0.
This investment is irreversible and only incurs a fixed cost normalized to 1 and paid when
acquired. The unobservable investment i in specific knowledge increases the stock of specific
knowledge k and costs C(i). We assume that the stock of knowledge depreciates at rate
µ ∈ (0, 1) but increases additively with investment i such that k = µk0 + i, where k0 is the
previous period investment. Notice that we prefer to model the agent’s decision making in
terms of choosing k rather than i which is the same as long as the implicit constraint i ≥ 0
is satisfied.
In addition to these two types of investments, the agent also supplies an unobservable
productive effort e whose cost depends on knowledge k as given by G (e, k) = e
2
2k
. Thus, the
unobservable investment i increases specific knowledge k which reduces the marginal cost
of effort.13 Physical investment ϕ raises the productivity of effort such that the production
function is given by
q(e, ϕ) = pi (ϕ) eε
where ε is a production shock unknown at the time where efforts are exerted, with pi (1) >
pi (0) > 0. The payment w(q) is assumed to be linear such that w (q) = αq + β, with the
13Since in the existing model we do not explicitly model the principal’s side of the problem, the fact
that effort and the investment in human capital are unobservable is immaterial but it is important for
understanding the origins of the observed contract.
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contract parameters α and β chosen by the principal.14
The salient feature of our model is the assumption that agents (egg producers) are be-
having in a dynamically optimal fashion by maximizing the expected discounted sum of their
individual per period utilities. Within this context we treat the probability of contract re-
newal p at each period as well as the contract parameters α and β as Principal’s ex ante
commitments. Also, p ∈ [0, 1] can be treated as the Agent’s belief about the likelihood of
contract renewal. Committing to a renewal probability p encompasses the full commitment
case where p = 1 and the no-commitment case where p < 1. The limiting case where p = 0
corresponds to the situation where the Agent, knowing that the contract will not be renewed,
behaves myopically by ignoring the future benefits of investing. Contract parameters α, β, p,
which are the solution to the Principal’s intertemporal optimization problem, are then treated
as exogenous and fixed in the Agent’s decision problem.15
Concretely, at each period t, an agent makes a decision that maximizes the current period
utility plus the discounted sum of all next period utilities weighted by the probability that
the contract will be renewed. The instantaneous utility of the Agent who invests kt and
exerts effort et is U(w(qt)) − G(et, kt) − C(kt − µkt−1) where U(.) is an increasing concave
function. Then, the expected discounted utility of the agent who has initial knowledge k0
if he decides to invest in physical capital ϕ will be V (k0, 1) − 1 (where 1 is the fixed cost)
14Obviously, because both q and ϕ are observable and verifiable, the optimal static contract would consist
of a payment function w(q) but would also specify the investment ϕ, hence the assumed linear contract is
not optimal even in the static case, much less so in a dynamic context. However, as mentioned before, we
take the observed contracts as given without making any claims regarding their optimality.
15Notice that we do not allow the renegotiation of contract parameters based on the agent’s performance.
In this case we cannot assume that the long term optimal contract can be implemented with short term
contracts as in Rey and Salanie´ (1990). Unlike in their general model where long term contracts can be
implemented by short term renegotiable contracts in a repeated moral hazard environment, in our case the
technology and preferences are not time separable because of the accumulation of human capital k and of
the lump sum physical investment ϕ.
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where
V (k0, 1) = max{et,kt|ϕt=1}t≥1
∞∑
t=1
(pφ)t−1 [EU(w(qt))−G(et, kt)− C(kt − µkt−1)]
and the expected discounted utility of the agent who has initial knowledge k0 if he decides
not to invest in physical capital will be
V (k0, 0) = max{et,kt,,ϕt∈{ϕt−1,1}}t≥1
∞∑
t=1
(pφ)t−1 [EU(w(qt))−G(et, kt)− C(kt − µkt−1)]−1{ϕt>ϕt−1}
where φ∈ [0, 1] is the per period discount factor and by convention ϕ−1 = 0. Remark that
1{ϕt>ϕt−1} represents the fixed cost of investing in physical capital that has been normalized
to 1. It is equal to one if ϕt = 1 and ϕt−1 = 0 and zero for all other periods because this
investment choice is made only once (ϕt ∈ {ϕt−1, 1}). Then, denoting δ = pφ, we can write
the previous equations in a recursive form as
V (k0, 1) = max{e1,k1}
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δV (k1, 1)] (1)
and
V (k0, 0) = max{e1,k1,ϕ1∈{0,1}}
[
EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δ
(
V (k1, ϕ1)− 1{ϕ1>0}
)]
.
(2)
Remark that (2) can also be written as
V (k0, 0) = max
e1,k1
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δmax (V (k1, 1)− 1, V (k1, 0))] .
(3)
If the contract is a one-period contract with zero probability of renewal, then V (k, ϕ) is
simply equal to the agent’s one period expected utility EU(w(q))−G(e, k)−C(k−µk0). If,
at each period, the contract has the probability of renewal equal 1 (i.e. becomes effectively
long-term), then V (k, ϕ) is the sum of the expected discounted utilities. Recall that φ and
p and thus δ are completely exogenous, but the fact that δ > 0 makes the optimal choice of
k different from the one selected when δ = 0. The optimal choice of k also depends on ϕ.
Thus both k1 and ϕ1 (chosen in period 1) depend on δ.
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Let’s simplify the above general framework by assuming that agent’s preferences are such
that the expected utility of wage w is given by
EU(w) = Ew − γ
2
var(w).
This assumption of mean-variance criterium can be justified with Constant Absolute Risk
Aversion preferences and normally distributed income or with quadratic utility, in which
case the expected utility of the Agent is an increasing concave function of this mean-variance
criterium. Then, the value function for the Agent when it has invested in physical capital
V (., 1) and the value function V (., 0) when it has not invested in physical capital both satisfy
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The value functions V (., 0) and V (., 1) are increasing and concave
functions of their argument k.
Proof of Proposition 1: See Appendix.
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that initially the agent has not invested in ϕ,
hence ϕ0 = 0, and has a stock of knowledge investment k0. Now, the agent can choose to
invest in which case ϕ = 1, or postpone the decision into the next period in which case
ϕ = 0. If the agent chose not to invest (ϕ = 0) then he chooses both effort e and investment
k according to
max
e,k|ϕ=0
Ew(q)− γ
2
var(w(q))−G(e, k)− C(k − µk0) + δmax (V (k, 0) , V (k, 1)− 1)
where he takes into account the next period value of contracting given his investment in k,
which is the maximum of V (k, 0) and V (k, 1) − 1, depending on whether he will invest in
ϕ next period. If the agent chooses to invest in ϕ (paying a unit cost of 1) then he chooses
both effort e and investment k (taking into account that ϕ increases the current productivity
of effort) according to
max
e,k|ϕ=1
Ew(q)− γ
2
var(w(q))−G(e, k)− C(k − µk0) + δV (k, 1)− 1
where V (k, 1) is the next period value of having invested k and having invested in ϕ.
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Given ϕ and using var(w(q)) = α2pi (ϕ)2 e2σ2, the optimal choice of agent’s efforts is
obtained by solving
max
e,k|ϕ
αpi (ϕ) e+ β − γ
2
α2pi (ϕ)2 e2σ2 − e
2
2k
− C(k − µk0)− ϕ+ δ max
ϕ′∈{0,1}
[
V (k, ϕ′)− 1{ϕ′>ϕ}
]
where ϕ′ = 1 if ϕ = 1 or if V (k, 1) − 1 > V (k, 0) and zero otherwise. Assuming the Agent
is not indifferent between ϕ′ = 0 or 1 at the optimum, the first order conditions satisfied by
the optimal values e∗, k∗ are
e∗
k∗
=
αpi (ϕ)
1 + k∗γα2pi (ϕ)2 σ2
(4)
1
2
(
e∗
k∗
)2
= C ′(k∗ − µk0)− δV ′ (k∗, ϕ′) . (5)
where V ′ (., ϕ) denotes the derivative of V (., ϕ) with respect to its first argument k (and we
have used the envelope theorem with respect to ϕ′ which also depends on k). Based on the
above derivations we can state our main results that are summarized in Propositions 2, 3
and 4.
Proposition 2: The optimal investment in specific human capital k∗ is increasing in the
probability of contract renewal δ . Moreover, the application of productive effort e∗ is also
increasing in the probability of contract renewal if the value function is sufficiently concave
or the investment cost function is sufficiently convex.
Proof of Proposition 2: see Appendix.
Proposition 3: Ignoring its fixed cost, the physical capital investment always provides
the agent with positive benefits, i.e.: whatever k0, V (k0, 1) > V (k0, 0).
Proof of Proposition 3: see Appendix.
However, since the investment in physical capital is costly, its adoption can sometimes
be profitable and sometimes not, despite the fact that the adoption per se always generates
positive benefits. As shown in Proposition 4, whether the adoption is profitable or not
depends on the level of knowledge k0.
18
Proposition 4: Given contract and technological parameters α, δ, pi(0) and pi(1), and
a risk neutral Agent; there exist a threshold for the investment in specific capital k0 above
which the investment in physical capital ϕ is profitable, i.e. V (k0, 1)− 1 ≥ V (k0, 0).
Proof of Proposition 4: see Appendix.
Proposition 4 thus shows a rather intuitive result that the adoption of new performance
enhancing technology could be unprofitable in a given time period where the level of human
capital (accumulated knowledge or skills) is low, but could become profitable the next period
after more human capital k has been acquired. The result is obtained for risk-neutral agents,
but is also true for cases of low risk aversion via the continuity argument.
Finally, as in other dynamic investment models, it is always important to characterize the
steady state solution. The question of whether the steady state will in practice be reached
is outside the scope of this paper, but nevertheless its characterization is interesting. If
we consider empirically more relevant case where the agent has already invested in physical
capital, we obtain another interesting result that shows that the optimal steady-state behavior
of effort and the investment in human capital can either increase or decrease relative to the
pre-adoption levels depending on the value of technological and contract parameters. The
characterization of the optimal steady-state effort and investment in specific knowledge in
the post-adoption stage can be summarized as the following result.
Result 1: At the steady state, e∗ and k∗ are: increasing in µ and δ, decreasing in γ and
σ2 if and only if pi (1) > 1
α
, increasing in α if and only if pi (1) < 2
α
and increasing in pi (1) for
pi (1) ≤ 2
α
and decreasing in pi (1) for pi (1) ≥ 2
α
.
Proof of Result 1: see Appendix.
In summary, our model gives several potentially empirically testable predictions. First,
according to Proposition 2, switching from a short-term to a long-term contract (increasing
δ) induces the agent to exert larger effort (∂e
∗
∂δ
> 0) and invest more in the specific human
capital (∂k
∗
∂δ
> 0) with the positive effect on output via the production function. Despite the
fact that the productive effort (e) has no long term effect, it is complementary to specific
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investment in human capital (k) which becomes more valuable if the contract is long-term.16
Second, the effect of a switch from a short-term to a long-term contract on the agent’s
propensity to invest in observable physical capital (ϕ), which increases the productivity of
effort, is ambiguous. The benefit of this investment has to outweigh the fixed cost of adoption,
which does not happen necessarily at all levels of specific human capital but does occur for
sufficiently large human capital stock. Finally, in case where the investment in observable
physical capital was profitable and was actually carried out, the steady-state level of effort
and the level of investment in specific human capital could increase or decrease relative to
the pre-adoption stage.
4 Empirical Results
In line with the theoretical results developed in the previous section we formulate and em-
pirically test three hypotheses about the effects of contract duration change from short-term
to long-term on growers’ behavior. First, the contract switch will cause the investments in
unobservable human capital (specific knowledge) to increase. Second, the investments in
observable physical capital (cool cells) will increase as well. Both of those effects will im-
prove grower performance across various productivity margins. Finally, the contract switch
will cause effort to initially increases with a positive effect on all productivity measures but,
after the new technology has been adopted, could subsequently decrease reversing the initial
productivity gains.
4.1 Technology Adoption
There are two technological improvements that growers could have adopted to earn equip-
ment and performance bonuses. These are male feeders and cool cells, both of which would
16If contracts are short-term then the optimal efforts are such that the marginal costs of the invest-
ment in human capital is negative at the optimum, meaning that agent under-invests in k. When δ > 0,
∂
∂k [G(e, k) + C(k − k0)] can be of any sign at the optimum.
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automatically earn equipment bonuses and improve the feed conversion ratios and the hatch-
ability of eggs thereby improving chances to earn performance bonuses. The adoption rates,
which are presented in Table 4, exhibit stark differences. Prior to the introduction of the
new contract in January 1997, 88.5% of the flocks were already grown with male feeders,
whereas only 9.6% of the flocks were grown with cool cells. Two factors can explain the
difference. First, the equipment bonus for male feeders and high profile grills was introduced
2 years earlier (January 1993) than the equipment bonus for cools cells (April 1995), so it is
reasonable to expect earlier adoption of male feeders than cool cells. Secondly, installing cool
cells represents substantially larger investment, so it is not surprising that the more rapid
adoption of cool cells followed the introduction of the new long-term contract which gave
contract growers some security against abrupt termination. The steady increase in adoption
rates for cool cells after the introduction of the new contract is clearly visible from Table 4.
The percentage of flocks grown with cool cells was steadily increasing from 13.5% in 1997 to
75.5% in 2002.
Table 4: here
A more formal way of capturing the effect of the contract switch on the technology
adoption is to run probit regressions. The results, summarized in Table 5, clearly show
that the indicator variable for the contract switch labeled lt, specified to be equal 1 if the
year is greater or equal 1997 and 0 otherwise, is positive and significant in both regressions.
Changing the contract from short-term to long-term increased the probability of technology
adoption for both cool cells and male feeders. This is true even after we include the individual
yearly dummies that are picking up other unspecified changes in the incentive structure of
the contract as well as the introduction of the new breed.17
Table 5: here
17Notice that coefficient estimates for some years are missing. This is because insufficient variability of the
dependent variable on those years prevented the identification of these year effects.
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The other two explanatory variables of interest are the division indicator and the size of
the facility. The results show that the probability of technology adoption is larger in division
M then in division H.18 Given the fact that growers in both divisions were always operating
under identical contract payment schemes, the differences could be due to the systematic
differences in the quality of the production facilities and/or growers’ abilities and effort.
Another possible explanation can be that there are some systematic differences between two
divisions regarding location, geography and climate. The expected sign of the size variable
is positive as we were expecting to see higher probability of adoption with larger housing
facilities. As it turned out, square footage (sqft) has the correct positive sign, however, the
parameter is not significantly different from zero.
4.2 Pure Effort Effect
The fact that the last version of the old contract has the same payment mechanism as the
new long-term contract enables us to identify the effects of the contract length on growers’
performance. This is accomplished by specifying another indicator variable which equals 1 for
the period during which none of the contract parameters have changed (7/1/1996 - 3/1/1998)
and 0 elsewhere and then multiplying that variable with previously defined lt. The product
of the two indicator variables gives a new indicator variable, labeled plt, which captures the
effect of the change in contract duration net of influences caused by changing other contract
parameters.
The empirical strategy that we implemented consists of two steps. In the first step
we estimate the performance equations without the technology adoption variables. In the
second step we include the technology adoption variable (say cool cells) to evaluate its impact
on the magnitude and the statistical significance of the plt coefficient. The idea is that if
switching the contract from short-term to long-term impacted the grower performance only
18This is in line with other results showing consistently superior performance of growers in division M .
Both divisions are approximately the same size. The total number of flocks settled in M division is 242 and
in H is 256.
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via the investment in the observable productivity enhancing technology, then we should see
the magnitude and/or statistical significance of the plt coefficient deteriorate. If this did not
happen, then we would conclude that in addition to expediting the observable investments,
the contract switch also stimulated the unobservable and hence non-contractible investments
that are complementary to grower’s effort.
The analysis is carried out using different performance measures. The first set of results
deals with the egg production. Dependent variables in our regression models are the same four
performance indicators used before. The OLS results are presented in the first four columns of
Table 6. The results are virtually identical across different performance measures. The most
important point to make is that the plt coefficient is positive and significant, which means
that the clean impact of switching from a flock-by-flock to a 15-year contract on grower
productivity is positive. At the same time the lt coefficient is also positive and significant for
two performance variables measuring total eggs production (ratio1 and ratio3) but negative
for the remaining two performance variables measuring hatching eggs production. This is
the first indication that, after the new technology has been adopted, the initial increase in
effort could have been reversed despite the additional incentives provided by the increase in
the base price for hatching eggs on June 25, 1998 and then again on January 1, 2000 (see
Table 1 for details). This effect has been most likely magnified by the introduction of the
new breed that began in 1998.
The other results indicate that the performance of contract growers in division M is
always superior to the performance in division H, and that the longer the hens stay in
production (days) the more eggs they will produce, either on a per hen or on a per square
foot basis. Finally, somewhat unexpectedly, the performance of the in-season flocks (seas) is
significantly worse than that the performance of the out-of-season flocks. This is most likely
the consequence of consistently higher piece rates for eggs produced by out-of-season flocks,
showing that incentives really work.
The next set of results deal with the hatchability of hatching eggs. Same as before, we use
three different measures. The results are presented in columns (5)-(7) of Table 6. In addition
23
to the explanatory variables used before, we included two dummy variables capturing the
announced changes in hatchability bonuses. Referring to Table 1, one can see that the
hatchability bonus has been changed twice during the period covered by the data. The
variable hd1 assumes the value of 1 for all dates larger than or equal to the date of the first
change and 0 elsewhere, and hd2 is defined similarly for the second change in the hatchability
bonus. The first change is impossible to evaluate since we don’t know what this bonus was
prior to this change because it occurred outside our data range. The second change is
characterized by an increase in the rate from half a cent to 1 cent and the hatchability target
was lowered, so this change should generate positive incentives to exert effort. However, the
change was most likely made to offset the negative impact on hatchability associated with
the switch to a new breed of birds.
The regression in column (5) also has the number of hens (hens) as an explanatory
variable. As expected it is positive and significant: more hens will produce more eggs and
more of them will have a chance to hatch. The main results are pretty much in line with the
previous findings. The plt variable is positive and significant in all three cases confirming
the positive impact of the contract switch on productivity. However, the lt variable is now
always negative and significant in 2 out of 3 models, indicating that either the reduction in
effort, or the breed change, or both, definitely had negative impact of the hatchability of eggs.
Same as before, the coefficient on division M is positive and significant as so is the days.
The season indicator is not significant when it comes to hatchability measures and only the
second change in the hatchability bonuses had a positive impact on the actual hatchability
results.
The last two models in columns (8) and (9) of Table 6 deal with the feed conversion
ratios. Again, the main results are identical to the ones obtained before. The coefficients on
plt are this time negative and significant because lower feed utilization per dozen eggs means
better performance. However, the lt coefficients are not significant meaning that the change
in effort and breed did not have appreciable effects on feed conversion. This is in line with
the fact that these newly introduced breeds only suffer from decreased egg production and
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hatchability but not from inferior feed conversion. Also, the fact that standard husbandry
practices for laying hens (and most other animals grown in confinement) is described by
animals eating ad libidum or at will, the importance of grower effort is likely to be rather
small.
The first change in the feed conversion bonus is captured by dummy variable fcd1 and
the second change with fcd2. The definition of these variables mimics the definition of the
hatchability bonus variables (see Table 1 for exact dates). The impact of the first change on
grower incentives to work hard cannot be evaluated because we don’t know what that bonus
was before the change. The impact of the second change is most likely negative because the
rate stayed the same (plus or minus 4 cents per dozen eggs per each percent outside the target
feed conversion rate) but the target feed conversion was increased so it now became easier
to earn the bonus (or avoid the penalty) than under the old rules. As seen from columns (8)
and (9), the first bonus change dummies are insignificant in both models, but the second are
positive and statistically significant. Therefore, the result is in line with our expectations,
indicating that increasing the feed conversion ratio target dulled the incentives to exert effort
and in fact feed conversion deteriorated (increased).
Table 6: here
4.3 Non-contractible Investments
The second step in the estimation procedure is based on the proof by contraposition, i.e.
by showing that the hypothesis that all improvements in grower productivity come from the
adoption of observable technological improvements such as male feeders or cool cells is false.
The decisions to adopt these new technologies are clearly endogenous. Different growers,
depending on their idiosyncrasies, will gave different incentives towards technology adoption.
To deal with the endogeneity of technology adoption, we exploit the panel nature of the data
set and estimate our models with grower fixed effects. The specification of all models stayed
essentially the same as before, the only difference being the inclusion of the indicator variable
cool which assumes the value of 1 if the flock was grown under the cool cells environment and
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0 if not. The dummy variable for male feeders was not used, because, as seen from Table 4,
at the time of the contract change virtually all growers have already adopted this inexpensive
technology. The only other difference relative to the previous specification is the omission of
the division indicator (M), which becomes redundant with grower fixed effects. The results
are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: here
The obtained results are surprisingly consistent across all 9 models. Several interesting
findings are worth pointing out. First, we see that plt is always positive and most of the time
significant at 1% which convincingly shows that switching the contract duration from a short-
term to long-term contract had positive impact on productivity. Secondly, the technology
adoption variable cool is positive and significant in 7 out of 9 models indicating a positive
impact of technology adoption on productivity. In the remaining two cases, which are both
feed conversion models, cool is insignificant (and also has the wrong sign). It looks like
cool cells do not significantly improve feed conversion over and above what male feeders
do. Thirdly, the final hypothesis of this paper is confirmed by showing that the opposite
hypothesis that the entire gain in productivity came about via cool cells adoption is false.
This result seems to be indicating that switching the contract from short-term to long-
term also solved the under-investment problem by stimulating growers to carry out other
unobservable and hence non-contractible investments which turn out to be complementary
with the cool cells technology.19 This conclusion is supported by the results showing that in
all 9 specifications, the magnitude of the plt coefficient after the inclusion of the cool variable
(Table 7) is larger than before (Table 6).
19Vukina and Leegomochai (2006a, p. 592) talking about contract production of broiler chickens wrote:
“In addition to investing in chicken houses, growers invest in their own education, training and mastery of
various special skills (disease detection, culling of sick birds, bio-security practices, feed management and
waste management, etc.) and they also invest in other pieces of equipment and machinery that are not
exclusively used for the chicken contract operation but are rather shared with other enterprises on the farm
(front-end loader, tractor, manure spreader, etc.). All these investments are hard to observe by the integrator
and would be even harder to verify by the courts, hence they are deemed non-contractible.”
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Finally, notice that the lt variable is now almost always negative and statistically signif-
icant. The exceptions to this general result are, again, the two feed conversion equations.
This result is supporting our hypothesis that the positive productivity impacts of the con-
tract change could have been subsequently (after cool cells were adopted) wiped out by a
decrease in steady-state effort. In all likelihood, the reduction in performance across nearly
all productivity margins was exacerbated by the introduction of Ross breed birds which per-
form worse when it comes to egg production and hatchability (especially in hot weather) but
hatched chicks would subsequently become superior broilers with lower feed conversion and
better meat yields.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we present the results of a natural experiment where a poultry company that
contract the production of hatching eggs with independent growers converted their short-
term contract (flock-by-flock) into a long-term contract (15 years). The nature of the change
in contract parameters enabled us to isolate the effect of the change in contract duration
from other changes in contract parameters on agents’ incentives to perform. Using contract
settlement data we showed that switching from a short-term to a long-term contract re-
sulted in increased investments in productivity enhancing technologies and practices which
improved performance across all productivity margins. The complementarity of unobservable
investments with effort created a result where the increased probability of contract renewal
increases equilibrium effort, but after the adoption of observable productivity enhancing tech-
nology the steady-state effort could either increase or decrease relative to the pre-adoption
stage.
An interesting side story in the presented empirical investigation, is that in period of 1-2
years after the introduction of the new long-term contract, the company also decided to switch
to lower productivity breed of laying hens. This new breed of birds perform worse along all
margins that hatching egg producers are remunerated against except feed conversion, but at
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the same time produce broiler chicks of superior genetic characteristics. The strategy makes
sense from the perspective of the vertically integrated broiler company who in addition to
contracting the production of hatching eggs, owns it own hatcheries, and also contract the
production of broilers. The animal input in the production of broilers, which when grown
to market weight would get slaughtered and processed for meat, are the one-day-old chicks
hatched from the same hatching eggs whose production has been contracted in the previous
stage. These new broilers that will grow from eggs from new breed laying hens will have
better (lower) feed conversion and will have better meat yields (larger breasts) than old ones.
The timing of the introduction of new breed together with the ambiguity of the theo-
retical prediction about the post-adoption equilibrium steady-state effort levels prevents us
from disentangling the two effects. All that we can say is that observed deterioration in
the performance indexes across wide range of productivity margins does not contradict the
theoretical prediction of our theoretical model.
The poultry company’s decision to change the breed of birds has not been explicitly stud-
ied in this paper. However, the problem of coordination among various links in a vertically
integrated production chain seems to be an intriguing topic of future research. However, the
second stage (production of broiler chickens) contract settlement data for this company is
not available, effectively closing this avenue of further research.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Lemma 1 : V (., 1) is increasing concave.
The proof is based on the standard Bellman equations solution techniques (Stokey, Lucas,
Prescott, 1989). Consider an operator T1 defined by T1 : v (.) → T1 (v (.)), where for all k0:
T1 (v (k0)) = maxe,k [H(e, k) + δv (k)] where H(e, k) = Ew(q)− γ2var(w(q))−G(e, k)−C(k−
µk0).
We can show that T1 is a contraction mapping of modulus δ.
Actually, for v (.) and w (.), and k0, there exist e
∗
v, k
∗
v such that T1 (v (k0)) = H(e
∗
v, k
∗
v) +
δv (k∗v) and there exist e
∗
w, k
∗
w such that T1 (w (k0)) = H(e
∗
w, k
∗
w) + δw (k
∗
w).
By definition T1 (v (k0)) ≥ H(e∗v, k∗v)+δv (k∗v) and T1 (w (k0)) ≥ H(e∗v, k∗v)+δw (k∗v). Thus,
∀k0, ∃k∗v , k∗w such that
δ [v (k∗v)− w (k∗v)] ≥ T1 (v (k0))− T1 (w (k0)) ≥ δ [v (k∗w)− w (k∗w)]
which implies that ‖T1 (v (.))− T1 (w (.))‖∞ ≤ δ ‖v (.)− w (.)‖∞ where ‖.‖∞ is the sup norm.
Moreover, T1 keeps monotonicity and concavity. Actually, assume v (.) is increasing con-
cave. Then T1 (v (.)) is also because using the envelope theorem
∂T1 (v (k0))
∂k0
= C ′(k∗ − µk0) > 0
and
∂2T1 (v (k0))
∂k20
= −C ′′(k∗ − µk0) < 0.
As the recursive formulation of V (., 1) shows that it is a fixed point of T1, the properties
of the operator T1 show that V (., 1) is an increasing concave function.
Lemma 2 : V (., 0) is increasing concave.
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Consider now the operator T0 defined by T0 : v (.)→ T0 (v (.)), where for any k0 T0 (v (k0)) =
max
e,k
[H(e, k) + δmax (V (k, 1)− 1, v (k))], where as before H(e, k) = Ew(q)− γ
2
var(w(q))−
G(e, k)− C(k − µk0).
We can show that T0 is a also contraction mapping of modulus δ.
Actually, for v (.) and w (.), for any k0 there exist e
∗
v, k
∗
v and e
∗
w, k
∗
w such that T0 (v (k0)) =
H(e∗v, k
∗
v)+δmax (V (k
∗
v , 1)− 1, v (k∗v)) and T0 (w (k0)) = H(e∗w, k∗w)+δmax (V (k∗w, 1)− 1, w (k∗w)).
By definition T0 (v (k0)) ≥ H(e∗w, k∗w) + δmax (V (k∗w, 1)− 1, v (k∗w)) and T0 (w (k0)) ≥
H(e∗v, k
∗
v) + δmax (V (k
∗
v , 1)− 1, w (k∗v)). Thus
δ [max (V (k∗v , 1)− 1, v (k∗v))−max (V (k∗v , 1)− 1, w (k∗v))]
≥ T0 (v (k0))− T0 (w (k0))
≥ δ [max (V (k∗w, 1)− 1, v (k∗w))−max (V (k∗w, 1)− 1, w (k∗w))] .
Therefore
T0 (v (k0))− T0 (w (k0)) ≥ δ [v (k∗w)− w (k∗w)] if V (k∗w, 1)− 1 ≤ w (k∗w)
≥ δ [V (k∗w, 1)− 1− V (k∗w, 1) + 1] = 0 if V (k∗w, 1)− 1 > w (k∗w) .
T0 (v (k0))− T0 (w (k0)) ≤ δ [v (k∗v)− w (k∗v)] if V (k∗v , 1)− 1 ≤ v (k∗v)
≤ δ [V (k∗v , 1)− 1− V (k∗v , 1) + 1] = 0 if V (k∗v , 1)− 1 > v (k∗v) .
This implies that ∀k0, |T0 (v (k0))− T0 (w (k0))| ≤ δ supk |v (k)− w (k)| and ‖T0 (v (.))− T0 (w (.))‖∞ ≤
δ ‖v (.)− w (.)‖∞ where ‖.‖∞ is the sup norm.
Moreover, T0 keeps monotonicity and concavity. Actually, assume v (.) is increasing con-
cave. Then T0 (v (.)) is also because using the envelope theorem
∂T0 (v (k0))
∂k0
= C ′(k∗ − µk0) > 0
and
∂2T0 (v (k0))
∂k20
= −C ′′(k∗ − µk0) < 0.
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As the recursive formulation of V (., 0) shows that it is a fixed point of T0, the properties of
the operator T0 show that V (., 0) is an increasing concave function. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2:
Expressions (4) and (5) imply that
e∗
k∗
=
αpi (ϕ)
1 + k∗γα2pi (ϕ)2 σ2
= [2C ′(k∗ − µk0)− 2δV ′ (k∗, ϕ′)]
1
2
k∗ =
αpi (ϕ) [2C ′(k∗ − µk0)− 2δV ′ (k∗, ϕ′)]−
1
2 − 1
γα2pi (ϕ)2 σ2
k∗ =
1
γσ2
1
αpi (ϕ)
[
T (k∗, δ)− 1
αpi (ϕ)
]
with T (k, δ) = [2C ′(k − µk0)− 2δV ′ (k, ϕ′)]−
1
2 .
Then
∂k∗
∂δ
=
∂
∂δ
T (k∗, δ)
αpi (ϕ) γσ2 − ∂
∂k
T (k∗, δ)
> 0
because T > 0, ∂T
∂k
< 0 and ∂T
∂δ
> 0.
As
∂
(
e∗
k∗
)
∂δ
=
C ′′(k∗ − µk0)− δV ′′ (k∗, ϕ′)− V ′ (k∗, ϕ′)
[2C ′(k∗ − µk0)− 2δV ′ (k∗, ϕ′)]
1
2
∂( e
∗
k∗ )
∂δ
> 0 if C ′′(k∗ − µk0) − δV ′′ (k∗, ϕ′) − V ′ (k∗, ϕ′) > 0 which will be the case if the
cost function is sufficiently convex or the value function sufficiently concave. A sufficient
condition whatever the convexity of the cost function is that −V
′′(k∗,ϕ′)
V ′(k∗,ϕ′) >
1
δ
which means that
the curvature of V (., ϕ′) is sufficiently large.
Then ∂
∂δ
(
e∗
k∗
)
> 0 implies ∂e
∗
∂δ
> 0 because ∂e
∗
∂δ
= k∗ ∂
∂δ
(
e∗
k∗
)
+ e
∗
k∗
∂k∗
∂δ
and we know that
∂k∗
∂δ
> 0.
Thus ∂e
∗
∂δ
> 0 because C ′′(k − µk0) − δV ′′ (k, ϕ′) > 0, C ′(k − µk0) − δV ′ (k, ϕ′) > 0 and
∂k∗
∂δ
> 0. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 3:
Let’s treat the productivity parameter pi (ϕ) as an independent parameter pi such that we
can defineW (k, 0, pi) andW (k, 1, pi) the value functions solution to the recursive formulation
W (k0, 1, pi) = max{e1,k1}
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δW (k1, 1, pi)]
and
W (k0, 0, pi) = max{e1,k1,ϕ1∈{0,1}}
[
EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δ
(
W (k1, ϕ1, pi)− 1{ϕ1>0}
)]
W (k0, 0, pi) = max
e1,k1
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δmax (W (k1, 1, pi)− 1,W (k1, 0, pi))] .
Using the same arguments as in Proposition 1, it is clear that value functions W (k0, 0, pi)
and W (k0, 1, pi) are increasing in pi. Actually, we can check that by defining
T (k0, 1, pi) = max{e1,k1}
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δW (k1, 1, pi)]
and
T (k0, 0, pi) = max
e1,k1
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δmax (W (k1, 1, pi)− 1,W (k1, 0, pi))] .
Then if W (k0, 0, pi) and W (k0, 1, pi) are both increasing in pi then T (k0, 0, pi) and T (k0, 1, pi)
are also increasing in pi.
Actually:
∂T0 (pi)
∂pi
= αe∗(1−γαpie∗σ2)+δ∂W (k
∗, 0, pi)
∂pi
1W (k∗,1,pi)−1<W (k∗,0,pi)+δ
∂W (k∗, 1, pi)
∂pi
1W (k∗,1,pi)−1≥W (k∗,0,pi)
is positive because e∗ = k
∗αpi
1+k∗γα2pi2σ2 and 1− γαpie∗σ2 = 11+k∗γα2pi2σ2 > 0, and
∂T1 (pi)
∂pi
= αe∗(1− γαpie∗σ2) + δ∂W (k
∗, 1, pi)
∂pi
> 0.
Thus, using a fixed point argument, W (k0, 0, pi) and W (k0, 1, pi) are both increasing in pi.
Next, if W (k, 0, pi) ≤ W (k, 1, pi) ∀k, then
T (k0, 0, pi) = max
e1,k1
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δmax (W (k1, 1, pi)− 1,W (k1, 0, pi))]
≤ max
e1,k1
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δmax (W (k1, 1, pi)− 1,W (k1, 1, pi))]
≤ max
e1,k1
[EU(w(q1))−G(e1, k1)− C(k1 − µk0) + δW (k1, 1, pi)] = T (k0, 1, pi) .
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Again, using the fixed point argument,W (k, 0, pi) ≤ W (k, 1, pi) for all k. As V (k0, 1) =W (k0, 1, pi(1))
and V (k0, 0) =W (k0, 0, pi(0)) we have that
V (k0, 1) = W (k0, 1, pi(1)) ≥ W (k0, 1, pi(0)) ≥ W (k0, 0, pi(0)) = V (k0, 0) .
Therefore, whatever δ > 0 and whatever k0, V (k0, 1) ≥ V (k0, 0). ¤
Proof of Proposition 4:
Looking at the limit case where δ = 0 and γ = 0 (risk neutrality), we have
V (k0, 0) = k
∗ (pi (0))C ′(k∗ (pi (0) , k0)− µk0)− C(k∗ (pi (0) , k0)− µk0) + β
V (k0, 1)− 1 = k∗ (pi (1))C ′(k∗ (pi (1) , k0)− µk0)− C(k∗ (pi (1) , k0)− µk0) + β − 1
because e
∗(pi(ϕ),k0)
k∗(pi(ϕ),k0)
= αpi (ϕ) = [2C ′(k∗ (pi (ϕ) , k0)− µk0)]
1
2 .
Then:
V (k0, 1)− 1− V (k0, 0) ≥ µk0 [C ′(k∗ (pi (1) , k0)− µk0)− C ′(k∗ (pi (0) , k0)− µk0)]− 1
≥ µk0 [pi (1)− pi (0)]C ′′(k∗ (pi (0) , k0)− µk0)− 1
= µk0 [pi (1)− pi (0)]C ′′
(
C ′−1
(
α2pi (0)2
2
))
− 1
> 0 for sufficiently large k0
because the function k∗C ′(k∗ − µk0) − C(k∗ − µk0) is strictly increasing in k∗ by strict
convexity of C(.) when k∗ − µk0 > 0 and k∗C ′(k∗ − µk0) − C(k∗ − µk0) ≥ µk0C ′(k∗ −
µk0), and k
∗ (pi (ϕ) , k0) being solution of αpi (ϕ) = [2C ′(k∗ (pi (ϕ) , k0)− µk0)]
1
2 , it shows that
k∗ (pi (ϕ) , k0) = µk0 + C ′−1
(
α2pi(ϕ)2
2
)
is increasing in pi (ϕ).
Therefore, V (k0, 1) − 1 − V (k0, 0) is an increasing function of k0 and it can be positive
for sufficiently large k0 . Hence, given α, pi (1), pi (0), C (.) there exists a threshold for k0
above which adoption of ϕ is always profitable and below which it is not.
Then, for a given k0, using the continuity argument, adoption can be profitable or not
even if δ > 0.
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With risk aversion, the sign of V (k0, 1) − 1 − V (k0, 0) is ambiguous, but using the con-
tinuity argument, the same result obtains at least for low risk aversion. ¤
Proof of Result 1:
At the steady state, we assume that investment in knowledge is such that the level of
knowledge is constant and thus k∗ = k0, that is i∗ = (1− µ) k0 = (1− µ) k∗, then
e∗
k∗
=
αpi (ϕ)
1 + k∗γα2pi (ϕ)2 σ2
= [2C ′((1− µ) k∗)− 2δV ′ (k∗, ϕ′)] 12 .
Considering the case where ϕ = 1 which implies that ϕ′ = 1, we have
2 [C ′((1− µ) k∗)− δV ′ (k∗, 1)] k∗ = αpi (1)− 1
γσ2α2pi (1)2
.
As 2 [C ′((1− µ) k)− δV ′ (k, 1)] k ≡ H (µ, δ, k) is an increasing function of k, k∗ is a decreasing
function of γ and σ2 if and only if pi (1) > 1
α
.
Moreover, ∂H(µ,δ,k)
∂δ
= −2V ′ (k, 1) k < 0, ∂H(µ,δ,k)
∂µ
< 0 and
∂H (µ, δ, k)
∂k
= 2 [C ′((1− µ) k)− δV ′ (k, 1)] + 2k [(1− µ)C ′′((1− µ) k)− δV ′′ (k, 1)] .
Thus ∂H(µ,δ,k
∗)
∂k
> 0 because C ′((1− µ) k∗) > δV ′ (k∗, 1) and therefore k∗ is also increasing in
µ and δ.
As αpi(1)−1
γσ2α2pi(1)2
increases in α and pi (1) if and only if 2
α
> pi (1), k∗ is increasing in α and
pi (1) if and only if 2
α
> pi (1).
As e∗ = k
∗αpi(1)
1+k∗γα2pi(1)2σ2 , is increasing in k
∗ and thus replacing k∗ by its steady state value,
e∗ is also increasing in µ and δ, decreasing in γ and σ2 if pi (1) > 1
α
.
As
e∗ = k∗
1
2H (µ, δ, k)
1
2
∂e∗
∂α
and ∂e
∗
∂pi(1)
have the same sign as ∂k
∗
∂α
and ∂k
∗
∂pi(1)
. ¤
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Table 1. Payment Schedule Changes
Base Price Male Cool H-Eggs C-Eggs H-Bonus FC-Bonus
Date H-Eggs Feeder Cell Pay Pay Target Pay Target Pay
In Out In Out In Out In Out
12/31/1991 0.27 0.27 0.09
11/1/1992 For pullets started on 85% 83-85% 0.005
1/30/1993 0.28 0.02 0.30 0.09
2/19/1994 0.29 0.02 0.31 0.09
4/29/1995 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.34 0.09
7/1/1996 0.30 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.34 0.35 0.09 7.5 7.75 0.04
2/1/1997 New long-term (15-year) contract introduced.
3/1/1998 0.30 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.35 0.36 0.09
5/25/1998 0.31 0.32 0.02 0.03 0.36 0.37 0.09
1/1/2000 0.32 0.33 0.02 0.03 0.37 0.38 0.09 84% 82-84% 0.01 7.75 8.00 0.04
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Table 2. Chronological Comparison of Performance Indicators: Mean Values
year ratio ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 hateg ht htsqft fct fch
1992 13.62352 6.504174 13.82734 6.601533 187943.2 11.71633 5.593549 7.0477 7.153063
1993 13.85631 6.545372 14.07112 6.646476 190723.3 11.79551 5.570035 6.729341 6.833485
1994 13.86231 6.646389 14.06521 6.744217 192168.8 11.77972 5.645693 6.744444 6.842645
1995 13.62012 6.568796 13.88926 6.698501 179710 11.41979 5.506977 6.82725 6.962161
1996 13.84207 6.735941 14.11094 6.866744 209060.3 11.8473 5.765253 6.656639 6.784405
1997 14.38927 7.012739 14.71136 7.169715 214923.5 12.18633 5.93943 6.412504 6.556086
1998 13.54823 6.658701 13.99965 6.879692 201863.4 11.32 5.564179 6.552951 6.769077
1999 12.88502 6.504866 13.25001 6.68879 199673.8 10.94152 5.523543 6.640927 6.830006
2000 12.68112 6.449746 13.05201 6.63808 200370.3 10.80281 5.494542 6.76171 6.960388
2001 13.26973 6.767959 13.68906 6.981626 213757.2 11.29958 5.763346 6.688801 6.901891
2002 13.41724 6.85166 13.79517 7.044735 210521.4 11.41284 5.828001 6.703446 6.892663
2003 12.69295 6.415357 13.01453 6.577991 185182.6 10.90392 5.511386 6.612257 6.780168
Legend:
ratio = number (in dozens) of hatching eggs per hen; ratio1 = number of hatching eggs per square foot;
ratio2 = total number of eggs (hatching plus commercial) per hen; ratio3 = total number of eggs per square
foot.
hateg = number of hatching eggs that actually hatched; ht = number of hatching eggs that hatched per hen;
htsqft = number of hatching eggs that hatched per square foot of the chicken house.
fct = total feed conversion; fch = feed conversion for hatching eggs.
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Table 3. Chronological Comparison of Grower Payments
Year Flocks Mean(TP) St.Dev.(TP) Mean(PPH) St.Dev.(PPH) Mean(PPSQ) St.Dev.(PPSQ)
1993 8 69,595.64 4,998.48 4.36 0.29 2.07 0.15
1994 34 75,919.85 5,513.35 4.69 0.35 2.22 0.23
1995 45 74,231.26 14,629.13 4.75 0.54 2.28 0.31
1996 47 80,985.62 9,378.93 4.93 0.58 2.38 0.31
1997 54 91,284.68 27,777.63 5.17 0.58 2.51 0.29
1998 50 96,581.62 25,133.39 5.45 0.53 2.66 0.26
1999 53 93,281.75 27,509.24 5.19 0.67 2.57 0.33
2000 54 100,240.31 31,775.89 5.45 0.87 2.76 0.44
2001 58 104,098.85 31,741.12 5.60 0.93 2.85 0.48
2002 53 108,137.51 35,004.95 5.73 0.70 2.92 0.36
2003 42 107,666.79 33,702.35 5.71 0.78 2.91 0.40
Total 498 93,757.35 28,920.21 5.28 0.77 2.62 0.43
Legend: TP = total payment per flock; PPH = payment per hen; PPSQ = payment per square foot.
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Table 4. Technology Adoption Rates
Cool Cells Male Feeders
Year∗ No Yes Flocks Rate No Yes Flocks Rate
1992 4 0 4 0.00% 2 2 4 50.00%
1993 28 0 28 0.00% 9 19 28 67.86%
1994 41 0 41 0.00% 9 32 41 78.05%
1995 47 1 48 2.08% 7 41 48 85.42%
1996 47 5 52 9.62% 6 46 52 88.46%
1997 45 7 52 13.46% 4 48 52 92.31%
1998 36 16 52 30.77% 2 50 52 96.15%
1999 26 28 54 51.85% 0 54 54 100.00%
2000 19 40 59 67.80% 0 59 59 100.00%
2001 16 35 51 68.63% 0 51 51 100.00%
2002 14 41 55 74.55% 0 55 55 100.00%
2003 0 2 2 100.00% 0 2 2 100.00%
*) Year corresponds to the date when birds are 25 weeks old.
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Table 5. Technology Adoption Results: Probit Regressions with Robust
Standard Errors
Cool Cells Obs. = 427
Log pseudolikelihood = -199.28809 Wald χ2(10)= 1151.64 Prob.> χ2=0.0000 Pseudo R2 = 0.3086
Coef. Std. Error z p
lt 5.717894 0.2681786 21.32 0.000
M 0.6837216 0.2986322 2.29 0.022
sqft 7.21E-06 9.60E-06 0.75 0.453
1995 2.865977 0.4490581 6.38 0.000
1996 3.61016 0.3394443 10.64 0.000
1997 -1.881707 0.2744702 -6.86 0.000
1998 -1.231332 0.2328823 -5.29 0.000
1999 -0.6437748 0.1962207 -3.28 0.001
2000 -0.2020698 0.1503272 -1.34 0.179
2001 -0.1816939 0.0810308 -2.24 0.0.025
2002 (omitted)
const. -5.610823 0.337196 -16.64 0.000
Male Feeders Obs. = 277
Log pseudolikelihood = -97.483984 Wald χ2(8) = 35.79 Prob.> χ2=0.0000 Pseudo R2 = 0.1340
Coef. Std. Error z p
lt 1.809001 0.5809108 3.11 0.002
M 0.6275569 0.4229988 1.48 0.138
sqft 0.0000252 0.000011 2.29 0.022
1993 0.441427 0.677693 0.65 0.515
1994 0.806232 0.668278 1.21 0.228
1995 1.140799 0.671481 1.7 0.089
1996 1.264637 0.675794 1.87 0.061
1997 -0.33417 0.419315 -0.8 0.425
1998 (omitted)
const -1.158838 0.7070426 -1.64 0.101
Years for which the estimates are missing means that in those years there was no adoption.
Standard errors are clustered at the grower level.
41
Table 6. Performance Measures: OLS Results
ratio ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 hateg ht htsqft fct fch
M 0.424 0.186 0.426 0.186 9,622 0.523 0.239 -0.182 -0.194
(0.081)** (0.048)** (0.082)** (0.048)** (1,394)** (0.074)** (0.043)** (0.033)** (0.034)**
lt -0.212 0.208 -0.046 0.297 -8,581 -0.467 -0.019 -0.064 0.009
(0.097)* (0.057)** (0.098) (0.058)** (1,981)** (0.105)** (0.060) (0.082) (0.084)
plt 0.849 0.193 0.784 0.156 16,989 0.978 0.343 -0.218 -0.267
(0.134)** (0.079)* (0.135)** (0.080) (2,500)** (0.134)** (0.077)** (0.061)** (0.062)**
seas -0.152 -0.095 -0.263 -0.150 962 -0.029 -0.032 0.087 0.037
(0.087) (0.052) (0.088)** (0.052)** -1,495 (0.080) (0.046) (0.035)* (0.036)
days 0.044 0.020 0.046 0.021 606 0.033 0.015
(0.004)** (0.002)** (0.004)** (0.002)** (68.5)** (0.004)** (0.002)**
hens 11.8
(0.184)**
fcd1 -0.076 -0.064
(0.079) (0.081)
fcd2 0.100 0.097
(0.047)* (0.048)*
const 1.151 0.842 0.973 0.766 -178,926 2.315 1.345 6.789 6.945
(1.138) (0.674) (1.154) (0.681) (20,507)** (1.103)* (0.633)* (0.042)** (0.043)**
hd1 585.3 -0.034 0.025
-4,623 (0.249) (0.143)
hd2 8,098 0.431 0.312
(1,885)** (0.101)** (0.058)**
obs 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498
R2 0.37 0.20 0.36 0.22 0.91 0.34 0.21 0.14 0.13
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 7. Performance Measures with Technology Adoption: Grower Fixed
Effects
ratio ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 hateg ht htsqft fct fch
lt -0.581 -0.048 -0.403 0.044 -11,909 -0.698 -0.164 -0.072 0.003
(0.117)** (0.070) (0.119)** (0.071) (2,109)** (0.110)** (0.065)* (0.074) (0.076)
plt 1.122 0.393 1.048 0.353 19,386 1.128 0.439 -0.181 -0.236
(0.140)** (0.084)** (0.141)** (0.084)** (2,430)** (0.130)** (0.077)** (0.055)** (0.057)**
seas -0.244 -0.110 -0.289 -0.132 -2,050 -0.146 -0.053 0.068 0.047
(0.199) (0.119) (0.201) (0.120) -3,365 (0.180) (0.106) (0.077) (0.079)
days 0.036 0.018 0.038 0.018 463 0.024 0.012
(0.004)** (0.002)** (0.004)** (0.002)** (70)** (0.004)** (0.002)**
cool 0.408 0.394 0.380 0.386 5,728 0.316 0.293 0.038 0.018
(0.133)** (0.080)** (0.134)** (0.080)** (2,356)* (0.126)* (0.075)** (0.054) (0.055)
hens 11.428
(0.252)**
fcd1 -0.065 -0.043
(0.071) (0.073)
fcd2 0.104 0.103
(0.044)* (0.046)*
const 3.741 1.718 3.589 1.652 -120,618 5.334 2.356 6.691 6.820
(1.174)** (0.705)* (1.189)** (0.711)* (21,668)** (1.131)** (0.670)** (0.056)** (0.058)**
hd1 -3,890 -0.300 -0.062
-4,579 (0.245) (0.145)
hd2 6,018 0.303 0.220
(1,891)** (0.101)** (0.060)**
obs 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498
i.d. 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
R2 0.36 0.20 0.34 0.21 0.85 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.10
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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